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Résumé / Abstract
Nous étudions dans ce document de recherche l'impact d'une augmentation
des coûts des soins de santé et de l'inflation en général sur le contrat optimal
d'assurance médicale et sur le gaspillage dans une économie où les agents-
consommateurs possèdent une information privilégiée et où le principal-assureur
doit encourir des coûts d'audit pour vérifier l'information des agents. Nous
montrons dans cet article que les agents seront plus que pleinement assurés au
sens où l'indemnité reçue est plus grande que la perte encourue. De plus, au fur et
à mesure que le coût des soins de santé augmente, les agents réduisent leur
probabilité de demander des soins de santé injustifiés, alors que le principal réduit
sa probabilité d'audit. En conséquence, le gaspillage associé aux audits onéreux
diminue. Nous montrons finalement qu'une augmentation dans le coût de la vie en
général (que nous approximons par une augmentation des pertes de salaire
encourues à cause de la maladie) réduit également le gaspillage associé aux audits,
mais dans une mesure moindre qu'une augmentation du coût des soins de santé.
In this paper, we examine the effect of increases in health care costs and
general inflation on optimal insurance policies and waste in a model of imperfect
information with costly auditing. We show that in such a setting, individuals will
buy more than full insurance. Moreover, as the cost of medical increases,
consumers (i.e., patients) reduce their probability of filing injustified claims, at
the same time as insurance providers audit with lower probability. As a result,
waste associated with costly auditing is reduced. We also show that a general
increase in the opportunity cost of illness (reflected through lost wages due to
illness) also decreases the likelihood of false claims, of auditing and thus of
waste, but not as much as health care costs increase.
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1 Introduction
As a result of a dramatic increase in health care spending in most OECD countries, great attention has
been focussed on its potential corresponding welfare loss.1 Consequently, much research has centered on the
possible causes of this growth and potential means of reducing it. Generally, economists are unconcerned with
an increase in a particular type of consumer spending as a percentage of GDP. However, given information
asymmetry and insurance in the health care market, the fact that more resources are spent on health care
is not necessarily without welfare consequences. First, given that most individuals are insured and illness
is di¢cult to measure, consumers (patients) may wish to consume health care beyond e¢cient levels (the
traditional moral-hazard problem). Furthermore, because patients, providers and insurers have di¤erent
information, each may attempt to manipulate available information in order to maximize their individual
bene…t. More speci…cally, physicians who are paid for each service they provide (the traditional fee-for-
service payment system) may encourage patients to consume care beyond e¢cient levels (known as supplier-
induced-demand).2 Thus, insurance and information asymmetry may lead to important losses in welfare. As
a result, many reforms have been proposed and implemented which attempt to reduce the growth in health
care spending.
Several reasons may account for the remarkable increase in health care spending. First, the proliferation
of insurance has made the moral-hazard problem common place (Manning et al., 1987). Furthermore, given
that health care is a normal good (or even possibly a luxury good), a general increase in economic well-
being has lead to greater consumption of health care services (Newhouse, 1977; Blomqvist and Carter,
1997). Also, many believe that increased competition in the physicians’ market has increased the prevalence
and magnitude of supplier-induced-demand and thus contributed to the increased cost of physician services
(McGuire and Pauly, 1991). Much of the increase in health care costs has, however, been attributed to
increased technology (Goddeeris, 1984; Weisbrod, 1991).3
Because of the increase spending on health care, many authors have attempted to measure the welfare
loss, of say, health care insurance (Newhouse, 1992; Blomqvist 1997). Most studies, have however, neglected
one potential bene…t (other than increased health) associated with higher costs or greater spending of health
care. That is, there may be an important bene…t associated with more expensive care when patients are
insured and have private information: the bene…ts of reduced auditing.
1 See Table 1 in appendix.
2 See Arrow (1963), Evans (1974), Stano (1987) and Dranove (1988).
3Other potential contributors to the increased costs of health care are the Medical Arms Race (Dranove et al., 1992) and
Unions (Sloan and Adamache, 1984) and the proliferation of malpractice litigation (Danzon, 2000).
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Given that physicians, patients and insurance providers have private information, each may want to use
such information asymmetry to extract rents. For example, physicians may want to over-treat their patients
if they are paid via fee for service. Alternatively, physicians who are paid on a capitated basis may have an
incentive to under-treat (Hillman et al., 1989; Stearns et al., 1992, Léger, 2000). Likewise, insured patients
may want to over-report their illness in order to increase their compensation (whether it is in the form of
medical treatment or lost wages in the case of workers-compensation). In the model presented below, we
examine the later case where patients may have an incentive to lie about their illness severity in order to
extract rents from the provider/insurer. As a result of this incentive, insurers may …nd it optimal to verify
the patient’s illness claim by auditing at a given cost. Because auditing is not costless, yet yields no direct
bene…t to either the patient or the insurer, it is, ceteris paribus, a resource loss. By including such auditing
costs in a game between consumers and the insurer, we examine the e¤ect of increased costs of health care
(what we term health care in‡ation) and general in‡ation on the optimal insurance contract as well as its
e¤ect on the cost of auditing (the welfare loss associated with auditing).4
Several results are worth noting. First, unlike the traditional models, we show that patients are o¤ered
insurance contracts in which they are over-insured; in other words, where their indemnity is larger than their
loss. This result comes from the fact that in a model of information asymmetry with auditing costs insurers,
who are not able to commit ex ante to an auditing strategy, will want to ’over-insure’ their customers to
increase their incentive to audit them (given the higher potential losses associated with patient-cheating).
Given that insurers have more incentive to audit their patients, patients in-turn will be forced to reduce the
amount of false claims they make to leave insurers indi¤erent between auditing and not auditing. Thus, in
the case of reported illness (justi…ed or unjusti…ed without auditing) the patient will receive a higher payo¤
but the probability that a patient …les an unjusti…ed claim (cheats) will decrease. We also show in the paper
that an increase in the cost of medical treatment (both through a direct increase in the price of medical
care or through increased losses due to lost wages as a result of illness) will lead to a decrease in the ’waste’
associated with auditing. Thus, the potential welfare loss associated with higher medical care costs may be
over-estimated as waste associated with insurance auditing is decreased.
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce a principal-agent model
with information asymmetry. In this section, we introduce a measure of waste associated with auditing and
examine the e¤ects of both general and health care in‡ation on waste. Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.
4Throughout the paper, we use the term ’health care in‡ation’ for any increase in health care costs. That is, health care
in‡ation may be a per unit increase in the price of treatment, or that technology and/or treatment norms are such that the
per-episode cost of treatment has increased.
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2 The Model
In the following section, we introduce a simple game between a consumer and a unique provider-insurer.5 In
the model, risk-averse consumers have VonNeumann-Morgenstern utility functions over …nal wealth where
U 0(:) > 0, U 00(:) < 0 and U 0(0) =1. The insurer is risk neutral. There are only two states of nature: sick
and healthy. The consumer is sick with probability ¼ < 12 .
6 If the consumer is sick, he must stop working
and looses labor income w. If the consumer seeks care (whether sick or not), the cost of medical care is given
by s. The health insurance market is perfectly competitive. That is, the premium paid by the consumer is
exactly equal to the expected payment in case of an accident plus expenses due to fraud. The insurer may
conduct an audit to con…rm the agent’s sickness. The cost of auditing is …xed at c. If, subsequent to an
audit, it is discovered that the consumer has sought unnecessary medical treatment, the consumer su¤ers
a utility loss of d:7 It is important to note that a healthy consumer may seek medical care (in order to be
compensated) and may continue to work. Furthermore, it is assumed that physicians are paid a …xed amount
for providing care to patients (i.e. paid fee for service) and thus have no incentive to ’turn-in’ patients who
lie. The consumer and the insurer play a game of asymmetric information in which the consumer knows
whether he su¤ered a loss (is sick), while the insurer does not.
The sequence of play is presented in …gure 1.
Figure 1: Sequence of play
5Throughout the paper, the masculine identi…es the agent, while the feminine identi…es the principal.
6This assumption is a technical condition of the model that guarantees mixed strategy equilibria (it its absence pure strategy
equilibria would occur where consumers would always cheat and insurers would never audit).
7We can view this as a loss of reputation, a …ne, an increase in future premiums or even prison time. The important part of
the penalty is that it is exogenous to the model. Indeed, Becker (1968) showed that if …nes were part of the insurance contract
(where …nes are paid to the insurer), the insurance provider would set …nes te be very large essentially reducing the probability
of consumer cheating and provider auditing to zero. In our model, the disutility of being caught may also be viewed as the
forgone utility of being shun from the health insurance market after getting caught. In other words, d may be viewed as the
present value of the agent remaining in autarcky for the rest of his life.
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In stage 1, the insurer o¤ers the consumer a contract that speci…es a coverage h in case of a loss at a
premium p. In stage 2, Nature decides whether the consumer is sick or not. This information is known
exclusively by the consumer. In stage 3, the consumer decides whether to seek medical treatments or not.
Subsequently, the insurer decides whether to audit or not audit the consumer. Finally, the payo¤s are paid
and the game ends. The payo¤s to the players are given in table 1.
Table 1
Payo¤s to the consumer and the insurer contingent on their actions and the state of the world.
State of
the world
Action of
Consumer
Action of
Insurer
Payo¤ to
Consumer
Payo¤ to
Insurer
Healthy Don’t Seek Conduct Audit U (Y ¡ p) p ¡ c
Healthy Don’t Seek Don’t Audit U (Y ¡ p) p
Healthy Seek Treatment Conduct Audit U (Y ¡ p)¡ d p¡ c
Healthy Seek Treatment Don’t Audit U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h) p¡ h
Sick Seek Treatment Conduct Audit U (Y ¡ p¡ s¡w + h) p¡ h¡ c
Sick Seek Treatment Don’t Audit U (Y ¡ p¡ s¡w + h) p¡ h
Sick Don’t Seek Conduct Audit U (Y ¡ p¡s ¡ w) p ¡ c
Sick Don’t Seek Don’t Audit U (Y ¡ p¡s ¡ w) p
The contingent states in italics never occur in equilibrium.
They represent actions that are o¤ the equilibrium path.
Stages two to …ve can be seen as a game of asymmetric information whose extensive form is given in
…gure 2.
We derive the perfect bayesian equilibrium by backward induction. The six elements of the Nash equilib-
rium are: (1) a strategy for the consumer when he is sick; (2) a strategy for the consumer when he is healthy;
(3) a strategy for the insurer when the consumer seeks treatments; (4) a strategy for the insurer when the
consumer does not seek treatments; and, (5)-(6) beliefs for the insurer at each information set. The unique
Nash equilibrium of this game is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For h > c1¡¼ , the unique Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
8 in mixed strategies is such that:
1-The consumer always seeks treatment if sick;
2-The consumer randomizes between seeking treatments and not when he is healthy;
3-The insurer never audits a consumer that doesn’t seek care;
4-The insurer randomizes between auditing and not auditing when the consumer seeks medical treatment.
8 In this game the notions of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium coincide. Since each player has
only two possible actions, then there will be at most one mixed strategy that each player can play in equilibrium. See Myerson
(1991) and Gibbons (1992) for details.
4
Figure 2: Extensive form of game.
Now, let Á be the probability of seeking treatment when a consumer is healthy, and Ã be the probability of
auditing given that a consumer sought treatment. In equilibrium, Á and Ã are then given by :
Á =
µ
¼
1¡ ¼
¶µ
c
h¡ c
¶
(1)
Ã =
U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h)¡ U (Y ¡ p)
U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h)¡ U (Y ¡ p) + d (2)
The insurer’s beliefs are ³(Healthy) = 1 and ³(Sick) = h¡ch , where ³(:) refer to the belief that the signal is
truthful.
Proof: Standard; see Boyer (2000) and Léger (2000).²
The comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium are interesting. First, we note that as the probability
of being sick increases, the probability that the consumer will commit fraud increases (@Á@¼ > 0). This results
from the fact that, as ¼ increases, it is easier for a healthy individual to pass himself o¤ as being sick as
the pool of sick individuals is larger. It also should be noted that the probability of committing fraud
increases as the cost of auditing increases (@Á@c > 0). This result is also intuitive; since it is more costly for
the insurer to audit a consumer, she will be less likely to audit, and as a consequence, the consumer will
attempt to defraud the insurer with greater probability. Surprisingly, the consumer is less likely to cheat as
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health bene…ts increase (@Á@h < 0). This result is due to the fact that the insurer has a greater incentive to
audit as health bene…ts (reimbursement h) increase. Consequently, the consumer reduces his probability of
committing fraud.
The model also predicts that the probability that the insurer audits decreases as the consumer’s net-of-
premium wealth (Y ¡ p) increases (as long as the utility function does not display increasing absolute risk
aversion), if and only if the level of health bene…ts is greater than the cost of health care services. In other
words, @Ã@(Y¡p) < 0 if and only if h > s.
9 In other words, as the net bene…t (h¡ s) increases relative to net
wealth (Y ¡p), the incentive to commit fraud increases for the consumer. This in-turn increases the insurer’s
incentive to audit the consumer’s health claims. Similarly, as the level of health bene…t (h) increases or as
the cost of medical care (s) decreases, the probability of auditing increases. This is due to the fact that
gains from fraud increase as h increases or s decreases; which implies a greater need for audits to keep the
consumer in check. Finally, the probability of auditing decreases as the penalty increases (@Ã@d < 0), as the
consumer’s incentive to commit fraud decreases.
We can now infer the health insurance premium p that yields zero expected pro…ts for the insurer. The
equilibrium insurance premium is given by:
p = ¼h+ (1¡ ¼)hÁ (1¡ Ã) + cÃ[¼ + (1¡ ¼)Á] (3)
where ¼h represents the expected treatment cost for a consumer who is truly sick. The two remaining terms
in the sum represent the cost of fraud borne by society. More speci…cally, (1 ¡ ¼)hÁ (1¡ Ã) represents
the expected extra amount of money per policy that the insurer must pay for unnecessary treatments and
cÃ [¼ + (1¡ ¼)Á] represents the expected cost of auditing.
The health insurance contract between the consumer and the insurer must incorporate the strategic
behavior of all players. That is, the insurer will anticipate rationally the strategies of each player when
o¤ering the consumer an insurance policy. For example, the insurer knows that the sick consumer will
always seek treatment. Furthermore, the insurer also knows that a healthy consumer will seek medical
treatment with probability Á in order to extract rents. Thus, cheating will only occur with some positive
probability when the consumer is healthy. As a result, the problem faced by the insurer becomes:
max
p;h
EU = ¼U (Y ¡ p+ h¡ s¡w) + (1¡ ¼) (1¡ Á)U (Y ¡ p) (4)
+(1¡ ¼)Á [(1¡ Ã)U (Y ¡ p+ h¡ s) + ÃU (Y ¡ p)¡ Ãd]
9As is shown further on, the level of health bene…ts is in fact greater than the cost of health care services.
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subject to the constraints
p = ¼h+ (1¡ ¼)hÁ (1¡ Ã) + cÃ[¼ + (1¡ ¼)Á] (5)
Á =
µ
¼
1¡ ¼
¶µ
c
h¡ c
¶
(6)
Ã =
U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h)¡ U (Y ¡ p)
U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h)¡ U (Y ¡ p) + d (7)
and subject to a Participation Constraint (8)
We disregard the participation constraint for now as it is redundant.10 By choosing p and h, the insurer
must take into account the impact of her decision on the subsequent game. By substituting (6) and (7) into
(4) and (5), the above yields the simpli…ed problem:
max
p;h
EU = ¼U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h¡w) + (1¡ ¼)U (Y ¡ p) (SP)
Subject to p = ¼
h2
h¡ c (9)
The …rst order condition of the simpli…ed problem yields a health bene…t (h) such that:
U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s¡w + h
´
¼U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s¡w + h
´
+ (1¡ ¼)U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c
´ = h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2 (10)
The denominator on the left hand side of (10) represents the expected marginal utility of the consumer
who purchases this contract. Because the left hand side of (10) is positive, h must be greater than 2c for the
right hand side to be positive. This is to be expected as the premium is a convex function of coverage that
reaches a minimum at h = 2c:11 For all c < h < 2c the premium decreases with coverage, while for h > 2c,
price increases with coverage. Since the consumer prefers more coverage to less, the tangency between the
utility function and the convex zero-pro…t constraint must lie on the upward sloping portion of the price
function, which occurs when h ¸ 2c. As a result, the optimal level of coverage is necessarily more than twice
as large as the cost of auditing.12 The solution to the problem does not o¤er much more by way of intuition.
We note, however, that full insurance (i.e., h = s+w) is not a solution to this problem (unless c = 0, which
is ruled out by assumption).
An interesting property of this optimal coverage is that the consumer’s utility is maximized when he
chooses a coverage greater than his possible loss (h > s+w). This is shown as proposition 1.
10The participation constraint states that the agent must be at least as well o¤ with the contract then in autarchy. It is easy
to show that autarchy is similar to choosing h = 0. Therefore the participation constraint binds only if h < 0, which does not
occur.
11For all h < c, the price is a concave function of coverage. However, it does not make sense to have h < c since this would
imply that the price is negative. As a consequence, we shall only examine the case where h > c.
12 It also implies that ¼ < 1
2
is a su¢cient condition to yield an equilibrium in mixed strategies for the game, as stated in the
assumptions.
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Proposition 1 The optimal bene…t is greater than the loss (h > s+w).
Proof. All the proofs are in the appendix.²
The consumer maximizes his expected utility by purchasing more insurance than is needed to exactly
compensate him for his illness. This non-standard result is a consequence of the costly auditing the inability
for the insurer to commit ex ante to an audit strategy. That is, the consumer receives ’too much’ insurance
to increase the insurer’s potential bene…t from auditing. To see why, note that the insurer has more to
lose by not auditing as the bene…ts increase. Therefore, as the insurance contract pays larger bene…ts, the
insurer has a greater incentive to ensure that the consumer is indeed sick. Knowing that the insurer has more
incentive to verify the health status of the consumers, they will modify their behavior so that insurers remain
indi¤erent between auditing and not auditing. If the insurer has more to gain by auditing, the consumer
must reduce his probability of requesting compensation when he is in fact healthy. This is made clearer by
examining the probability of requesting bene…ts when one is healthy, Á.That is, as h increases, Á decreases
(i.e.: @Á@h < 0).
By increasing the bene…ts paid to the consumer in case of sickness, the probability of a false claim is
reduced. A similar result is found by Picard (1996) and Boyer (1998) in a somewhat di¤erent setting. What
is however surprising, is that the amount of health bene…ts (the reimbursement h) received by the consumer
when sick is greater than the loss incurred; an atypical result in the literature. Boyer (1998) explains this
over-compensation as representing a replacement-cost-new insurance contract. Khalil (1997) and Khalil
and Parigi (1998) also obtain similar results. Using a similar framework to Baron and Myerson (1981),
Khalil …nds that an agent will over-produce a given output as a means of signalling that he will not cheat.
Also, Khalil and Parigi …nd, using Gale and Hellwig’s (1987) framework, that a banker will over-lend to an
entrepreneur as a signal of his willingness to verify the entrepreneur’s return on his project.
Although this over-compensation result is interesting in itself, it is not new in the literature. What is
innovative of this paper is its examination of what happens to over-compensation when the amount of risk
varies. This is the focus of the following section.
3 In‡ation
3.1 Health Care and General In‡ation
The goal of this section is to evaluate the e¤ect of an increase in potential losses associated with illness.
More speci…cally, we evaluate the e¤ects of (i) an increase in the costs associated with treatment s (what
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we call health care in‡ation), and (ii) an increase in the time cost associated with lost wages w (what we
call general in‡ation), on the optimal insurance bene…t h. We also evaluate the e¤ects of both health care
and general in‡ation on the waste associated with auditing. It is important to note that an increase in s can
be viewed as a proxy for the general increase in health care costs, and, an increase in w can be viewed as a
proxy for general economic growth.
The impact of an increase in health care costs on the optimal level of bene…ts is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Insurance bene…ts h increase as the direct cost of illness s increases; that is @h@s > 0. How-
ever, not by the full amount; that is @h@s < 1.
The impact of an increase of the opportunity cost of getting sick on the optimal level of bene…ts is shown
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Insurance bene…ts h increase as the opportunity cost of illness w increases; that is @h@w > 0.
However, not by the full amount; that is @h@w < 1.
It is interesting to see that increases in both the cost of health care and in the general level of prices, as
proxied by the opportunity cost of being sick, increase the amount of health insurance purchased, but not
by the full amount of the price increase. It is logical to expect that consumers will want to purchase more
insurance as it becomes more costly to get sick, whether the increased cost comes from higher a medical bill
or more lost wages. It is not as obvious why the increase should be less than proportional.
In a full information economy, consumers purchase full insurance. We should therefore expect to see a
one-to-one correspondance between health bene…ts increases, and heath costs and/or lost wages increases.
When consumers have proprietary information regarding the state of the world, and when the insurer cannot
commit to an auditing strategy ex ante, we will have, as proposition 1 shows, consumers who are over-insured.
When we have that @h@s < 1 and that
@h
@w < 1, it follows that consumers are over-insured less and less as
medical costs and/or lost wages increase. This should be expected since over-insurance is only a way to
signal that it is too costly for the insurance company to let consumers get away with …ling false claims. As
the cost of sickness increases, health bene…ts increase and thus the incentive for the insurer to make sure
that the …led claim is truthful increases. It then becomes less important for the insurer to send a costly
signal that not auditing is too costly since the rise in health care cost sends the same signal, but at a lower
cost.
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The interpretation of the impact of a rise in the cost of sickness, either through a rise in the cost of health
care itself or a rise in lost wages, on health bene…ts is driven by the fact that consumers are over-insured
in our model. In a model where the insurer is able to commit to an auditing strategy, such over-insurance
should not be observed, and increases in health care cost may or may not lead to proportional increases in
health bene…ts.
3.2 Impact on Waste
Although both the rise in the cost of medical care and in the cost of lost wages have similar impacts on
health bene…ts (both induce greater health ben…ts, but not proportionnaly so), nothing is apparent about
the real cost to society of such increases. More precisely, what we want to examine in this section the e¤ects
of both general and health care in‡ation on what we call the waste associated with fraud.
Because consumers have an incentive to lie about their illness, insurers will wish to minimize the costs
associated with unjusti…ed claims. The simple fact that some consumers will receive bene…ts from fraudulent
claims is not, in and of itself, a waste - it is simply a redistribution of income and has no e¤ect on total
wealth. Rather, the real cost of fraud is the loss of wealth that occurs as a result of auditing at cost c.
More speci…cally, the real monetary cost of fraud (Waste) is given by:
Waste = Z = [(1¡ ¼)Á+ ¼]Ãc (11)
The following proposition illustrates the impact of health care in‡ation (ds) and general in‡ation (dw) on
waste Z.
Proposition 4 Health care in‡ation and general in‡ation decrease waste Z.
This result is interesting for several reasons. First, if the real cost of treatment has increased (that is,
the increase in medical care prices is greater than the general increase in prices), than the burden imposed
by health care in‡ation may be over-estimated. Given that insurance providers must pay more for a given
illness realization and its corresponding treatment, they will be more likely to audit patients who …le such
an illness-treatment claim. Given this increased incentive to audit, patients will reduce the amount of false
claims they make. As a result, the probability that patients will behave fraudulently and seek unjusti…ed
medical services will decrease. Similarly, increases in the opportunity cost of time associated with illness will
also decrease the amount of fraudulent claims and subsequent audits.
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Although both general and health care in‡ation decrease the probability of fraudulent claims and, con-
sequently, reduce the amount of waste that is generated by audits, health care in‡ation decreases waste at
a faster rate than does general in‡ation.
Proposition 5 Health care in‡ation reduces the cost of fraud more than general in‡ation.
This result is driven by the fact that health insurance compensates a consumer not only for costs related
to medical care, but also for lost wages associated with an incapacity to work when sick.13 From an insurance
payment perspective, it is irrelevant whether the cost of health services increases by a dollar or whether the
opportunity cost of being sick increases by a dollar. In both cases, the consumer’s monetary loss of being
sick is increased by a dollar and compensation should increase accordingly. That is, in the case of illness,
the impact of an increase in health care costs on health bene…ts is identical to the impact of an increase in
lost wages on health bene…ts; i.e. @h@s =
@h
@w .
Given that the di¤erence between the reduction of waste associated with health care in‡ation and general
in‡ation does not come from their respective impact on health bene…ts, the source of the di¤erence must
come from their impact on the Nash Equilibrium Strategies of the two players.
From the consumer’s probability of committing health care fraud (Á), it is evident that neither the health
care cost nor the opportunity cost of being unable to work has an impact on Á other than through health
bene…ts. As a consequence, both types of in‡ation have the same impact on the consumer’s probability
of committing fraud, as the impact of both cost increases on health bene…ts is identical. As a result, the
di¤erence in the reduction of waste must be due to a reduction in the probability of auditing. That is, it
must be the case that the probability of auditing is reduced by more following an increase in the direct health
care cost (s) than following an increase in the indirect cost of illness (w).
With respect to the insurer’s probability of auditing (Ã), only the cost of health care services has a direct
impact on Ã (i.e., not an indirect impact on health care bene…ts, h). Hence, the opportunity cost of being
sick (w) should not have an impact on the insurer’s probability of auditing given that the opportunity cost is
not incurred by consumers who may commit fraud. On the other hand, healthy fraudulent consumers must
13Another component of the cost of fraud is the disutility of getting caught. This waste is given by Z0 = (1¡ ¼)ÁÃk. It is
also clear that an increase in s reduces waste more than an increase in w. In other words, dZ
0
ds
< dZ
0
dw
. To see why, note that
we have dZ
0
ds
< dZ
0
dw
if and only if
(1¡ ¼)
³
dÁ
ds
¡ dÁ
dw
´
Ãk + (1¡ ¼)
³
dÃ
ds
¡ dÃ
dw
´
Ák < 0
Given that dÁ
ds
¡ dÁ
dw
= 0 and that dÃ
ds
< dÃ
dw
(see the proof of proposition 5), it follows that an increase in health care in‡ation
reduces waste associated with getting caught more than an increase in general in‡ation as measured by the opportunity cost of
being sick.
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seek health care services for which they have no need for if their claim is to be perceived as credible. As the
implicit cost associated with falsely signalling a ’medical need’ increases (i.e., when s increases), consumers
will have a reduced incentive to commit fraud; as the increase in the reimbursement they receive (in the
case of a successful fraudulent claim) is less than proportional to the increase in the medical cost itself. In
other words, since consumers have less to gain by committing fraud as the cost of medical services increases
(as compared to an increase in the opportunity cost w), the insurance provider will …nd it less necessary to
audit. Waste is thus reduced more by an increase in medical cost (s) than by an increase in general cost (w).
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this paper was two-fold. First, we examine the type of health/disability insurance contract that
should be o¤ered in an economy where the insurer is unable to commit to an auditing strategy when a
consumer …les a claim. Second, we examine the impact of an increase in the cost of health care services on
fraud.
Assuming that consumers who are truly sick cannot work, thereby losing labor earnings, and that con-
sumers who fake an illness still work, we …nd that the optimal health insurance contract over-compensates
consumers when the insurer cannot commit ex ante to an auditing strategy. This result is dependent on
two important assumptions: the inability for the insurer to commit to an auditing strategy and a perfect
insurance market. In our context, the perfect-health-insurance-market assumption implies that all premi-
ums paid by the consumers are devoted to either (i) compensating the consumer, or, (ii) paying for audits.
Realistically, however, premium paid by consumers include not only compensation and auditing costs, but
also underwriting, management, marketing and …nancing costs. These costs have often been modelled as a
proportional loading factor on the premium paid. In other words, the premium paid (PP ) is in excess of the
pure premium (p) by some factor (m): PP = (1 +m) p. By adding such a proportional loading factor to
the pure premium, it can easily be shown that the amount of coverage is reduced. It is perhaps this type of
loading factor that prevents insurance companies from o¤ering a contract where agents are over-compensated
for their losses.
In our model, over-compensation represents a costly message sent by the insurer to the consumer. This
message signals to the consumer that the insurer has more to lose by not auditing a consumer’s claim, and,
therefore, that the consumer should reduce accordingly his likelihood of …ling a false claim. It is clear from
the equilibrium condition that the consumer’s probability of …ling a false claim decreases as the indemnity
payment increases.
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Examining the impact of an increase in health care costs, the model predicts a decrease in fraudulent
claims. This result is driven by the fact that as the cost of treating a patient increases so does the indemnity
payment. As a result, the insurer has more to lose by not auditing, and thus, the consumer commits less
fraud. The model also predicts less fraud when the opportunity cost of being sick (w) increases. As previously
mentioned, it is important to note that fraud is not, in and of itself, wasteful; as it is simply the redistribution
of resources between agents. The real economic waste associated with fraud is the cost of auditing and the
disutility of getting caught cheating. With respect to these costs, we show that an increase in the cost of
health care services reduces waste more than an increase in the opportunity cost of being sick. In other
words, health care cost in‡ation reduces fraud more than general in‡ation.
The general conclusion we can draw from the health care fraud model presented herein is that the real
cost of health care cost in‡ation may be over-estimated in the economy since it does not incorporate the
waste reduction aspect associated with less fraud. As we have shown, fraud is reduced when health care cost
increases, provided that the cost of auditing remains unchanged. It follows that a bene…cial aspect of higher
medical cost may have been over-looked in the traditional health-care-cost in‡ation literature.
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5 Appendix: Table and Proofs
Table 1
Total Expenditure Health - Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
Year/Period Canada France Italy Belgium Japan Spain U.K. USA Sweden
1960 5.4 4.2 3.6 3.4 3.0 1.5 3.9 5.1 4.7
1965 5.9 5.2 4.3 3.9 4.5 2.6 4.1 5.7 5.5
1970 7.0 5.8 5.2 4.1 4.6 3.7 4.5 7.1 7.1
1975 7.2 7.0 6.2 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.5 8.0 7.9
1980 7.2 7.4 7.0 6.4 6.5 5.6 5.7 8.9 9.4
1985 8.4 8.3 7.1 7.2 6.7 5.7 5.9 10.4 9.0
1990 9.2 8.8 8.1 7.4 6.1 6.9 6.0 12.4 8.8
1995 9.5 9.8 8.0 8.2 7.2 7.0 7.0 13.9 8.4
(Constructed using the OECD Health Data 2000)
Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. All we need to show is that the …rst order condition is positive at h = s+w:
U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶"
1¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2
#
¡ (1¡ ¼)U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c +w
¶
¼
h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2 ¸ 0 (12)
Letting h = s+w and simplifying, we …nd that (12) holds if and only if
1¡ h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2 ¸ 0 (13)
This clearly holds if c > 0. Therefore h > s+w.²
Proof of proposition 2 a)We …rst want to show that dhds > 0. Let ­ represent the …rst order condition
rewritten as
­ = U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶h
(h¡ c)2 ¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
i
¡ (1¡¼)U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c +w
¶
h (h¡ 2c) = 0 (14)
Using total derivatives, we know that @­@h dh+
@­
@s ds = 0, where
d­
ds
= ¡
h
(h¡ c)2 ¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
i
U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
(15)
@­
@h
= 2 (1¡ ¼) (h¡ c)
·
U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
¡ U 0
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c +w
¶¸
(16)
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)¼h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2
·
U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c +w
¶
¡ U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶¸
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
+c2
"
1¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2
#
U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
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Since d­ds > 0 and
@­
@h < 0,
14 it follows that dhds > 0, as we wanted to show.
b) We now want to show that this increase in health bene…ts is smaller than the increase in health care
cost; i.e., dhds < 1. This occurs when
dh
ds
= ¡
@­
@s
@­
@h
= ¡
¡
h
(h¡ c)2 ¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
i
U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
26666664
2 (1¡ ¼) (h¡ c)
h
U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
¡ U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c +w
´i
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2
h
U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c +w
´
¡ U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´i
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
+c2
h
1¡ ¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2
i
U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
37777775
< 1
(17)
We know that @­@h < 0. Combining terms we …nd that
dh
ds < 1 if and only if26664
2 (1¡ ¼) (h¡ c)
h
U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
¡ U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c +w
´i
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2
h
U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c +w
´
¡ U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´i
+¼hch
2¡3hc+3c2
(h¡c)2 U
00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
37775 < 0 (18)
A su¢cient condition for (18) to hold is that
¼hc
h2 ¡ 3hc+ 3c2
(h¡ c)2 > 0 (19)
The reason is that the …rst two lines of (18) are negative since h > s, and that U 00 (:) < 0. The zeros of (19)
are h = 0, h = 32c+
1
2 ic
p
3, and h = 32c¡ 12 ic
p
3. It is therefore clear that (19) holds for any real h. Hence,
dh
ds < 1.²
Proof of proposition 3 a) We …rst want to show that dhdw > 0. We already have
@­
@h from (16). We
must now …nd @­@w as
d­
dw
= ¡(1¡ ¼)U 00
µ
Y ¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c +w
¶
h (h¡ 2c) (20)
Clearly d­dw > 0. Given that
@­
@h < 0, it follows that
dh
dw > 0, as we wanted to show.
14 @­
@h
is negative since each line is negative:·
U 0
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
¡ U 0
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c
¶¸
is negative since h > s, as shown in proposition 1,
(1¡ ¼) h (h¡ 2c)¼h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2
·
U 00
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c
¶
¡ U 00
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶¸
for the same reason, and
(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)U 00
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
+ c2
·
1¡ ¼h (h¡ 2c)
(h¡ c)2
¸
U 00
µ
A¡ ¼ h
2
h¡ c ¡ s+ h
¶
is clearly negative since U 00 (:) is negative.
18
b) Similarly to proposition 2’s part b) proof, we want to show that dhdw < 1. Given that
@­
@h < 0,
dh
dw < 1
occurs if and only if @­@w ¡ @­@h < 0. Combining terms we …nd that dhdw < 1 holds if and only if26664
2 (1¡ ¼) (h¡ c)
h
U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s+ h
´
¡ U 0
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c +w
´i
+(1¡ ¼)h (h¡ 2c)¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2
h
U 00
³
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¡ U 00
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+
³
1¡ ¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2
´
c2U 00
³
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´
37775 < 0 (21)
A su¢cient condition for (21) to hold is that 1¡¼ h(h¡2c)
(h¡c)2 > 0, which clearly holds for c > 0. Hence,
dh
dw < 1.²
Proof of proposition 4 From waste Z given in (11), we …nd
dZ
ds
= (1¡ ¼) dÁ
ds
Ãc+ [(1¡ ¼)Á+ ¼] dÃ
ds
< 0 (22)
and
dZ
dw
= (1¡ ¼) dÁ
dw
Ãc+ [(1¡ ¼)Á+ ¼] dÃ
dw
c < 0 (23)
because dÁds < 0;
dÃ
ds < 0;
dÁ
dw < 0 and
dÃ
dw < 0:²
Proof of proposition 5 Using (22) and (23), we want to show that dZds <
dZ
dw . This occurs if and only if
(1¡ ¼)
µ
dÁ
ds
¡ dÁ
dw
¶
Ãc+ [(1¡ ¼)Á+ ¼]
µ
dÃ
ds
¡ dÃ
dw
¶
c < 0 (24)
Since dÁds ¡ dÁdw = @Á@h @h@s ¡ @Á@h @h@w = @Á@h
¡
@h
@s ¡ @h@w
¢
and since @h@s ¡ @h@w = 0, it follows that dÁds ¡ dÁdw = 0. To
see why, note that
dh
ds
= ¡
¡
h
(h¡ c)2 ¡ ¼h (h¡ c)
i
U 00
³
Y ¡ ¼ h2h¡c ¡ s¡w + h
´
@­
@h
=
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dw
(25)
What remains is that dZds <
dZ
dw if and only if
dÃ
ds ¡ dÃdw < 0
Rewriting dÃds and
dÃ
dw as
dÃ
ds
=
@Ã
@s
+
@Ã
@h
@h
@s
and
dÃ
dw
=
@Ã
@h
@h
@w
(26)
we thus have
dÃ
ds
<
dÃ
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i¤
@Ã
@s
+
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@h
@h
@s
¡ @Ã
@h
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@w
< 0 (27)
Given that @h@s =
@h
@b (see equation 25), all that is left to show is that
@Ã
@s
= ¡ U
0 (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h) d
[U (Y ¡ p¡ s+ h)¡ U (Y ¡ p) + d]2 < 0 (28)
which is obvious. Hence dZds <
dZ
dw < 0. ²
19
Liste des publications au CIRANO *
Cahiers CIRANO / CIRANO Papers (ISSN 1198-8169)
99c-1 Les Expos, l'OSM, les universités, les hôpitaux : Le coût d'un déficit de 400 000 emplois
au Québec — Expos, Montréal Symphony Orchestra, Universities, Hospitals: The
Cost of a 400,000-Job Shortfall in Québec / Marcel Boyer
96c-1 Peut-on créer des emplois en réglementant le temps de travail? / Robert Lacroix
95c-2 Anomalies de marché et sélection des titres au Canada / Richard Guay, Jean-François
L'Her et Jean-Marc Suret
Série Scientifique / Scientific Series (ISSN 1198-8177)
2001s-25 Simulation-Based Finite-Sample Tests for Heteroskedasticity and ARCH Effects /
Jean-Marie Dufour, Lynda Khalaf, Jean-Thomas Bernard et Ian Genest
2001s-24 The Role of Organizational Commitment and Citizenship Behaviors in
Understanding Relations between Human Resources Practices and Turnover
Intentions of IT Personnel / Guy Paré, Michel Tremblay et Patrick Lalonde
2001s-23 A Resource-Based Analysis of Outsourcing: Evidence from Case Studies / Vital
Roy et Benoit Aubert
2001s-22 Short and Long Memory in Equilibrium Interest Rate Dynamics / Jin-Chuan Duan
et Kris Jacobs
2001s-21 Unemployment Insurance and Subsequent Job Duration: Job Matching vs
Unobserved Heterogeneity / Christian Belzil
2001s-20 Estimating the Intergenerational Education Correlation from a Dynamic
Programming Model / Christian Belzil et Jörgen Hansen
2001s-19 The Bootstrap of the Mean for Dependent Heterogeneous Arrays / Sílvia
Gonçalves et Halbert White
2001s-18 Perspectives on IT Outsourcing Success: Covariance Structure Modelling of a
Survey of Outsourcing in Australia / Anne C. Rouse, Brian Corbitt et Benoit A.
Aubert
2001s-17 A Theory of Environmental Risk Disclosure / Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné et
Estelle Gozlan
2001s-16 Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply /
Pierre-André Chiappori, Bernard Fortin et Guy Lacroix
2001s-15 Properties of Estimates of Daily GARCH Parameters Based on Intra-Day
Observations / John W. Galbraith et Victoria Zinde-Walsh
2001s-14 A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons / Pierre Lasserre et Antoine
Soubeyran
2001s-13 Carbon Credits for Forests and Forest Products / Robert D. Cairns et Pierre
Lasserre
                                                
* Consultez la liste complète des publications du CIRANO et les publications elles-mêmes sur notre site Internet :
http://www.cirano.qc.ca/publication/documents.html
